Filtered generated 738 hits.
-
2005:58 The Swedish Concept for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel: Differences Between Vertical and Horizontal Waste Canister Emplacement
D. G. Bennett, T. W. Hicks SKI English...
Content type: Publications -
2005:65 Review Statement and Evaluation of the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Cos RD&D Programme 2004
SKI English...
Content type: Publications -
2005:20 DECOVALEX III PROJECT Modelling of FEBEX In-Situ Test
E. E. Alonso J. Alcoverro SKI English...
Content type: Publications -
2005:59 Reactive-Transport Model of Buffer Cementation
Randy Arthur, Wei Zhou SKI English...
Content type: Publications -
2005:61 Review and Assessment of SCC Experiments with RPV Steels in Oskarshamn 2 and 3 (ABB Report SBR 99-020)
Although the extent of cracking was rather surprising for a bolt-loaded specimen, the average stress corrosion crack growth rate of 0.5 mm/year over the five-year testing period does not represent an immediate concern. The overwhelming part of crack growth can have occurred during a 20 day chloride transient during the third year of exposure because of a condenser leakage after an outage. The...
Content type: Publications -
2005:55 Application of Master Curve Methodology for Structural Integrity Assessments of Nuclear Components
Iradj Sattari-Far, Kim Wallin SKI English...
Content type: Publications -
2005:36 Reports within the Area of Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation
Bengt-Göran Bergdahl SKI English...
Content type: Publications -
2005:41 Models for Fuel Rod Behaviour at High Burnup
Lars O. Jernkvist, Ali R. Massih SKI English...
Content type: Publications -
2005:16 Assessment of Core Failure Limits for Light Water Reactor Fuel under Reactivity Initiated Accidents
Lars Olof Jernkvist, Ali R. Massih SKI English...
Content type: Publications -
2004:16e Statement of the Situation Concerning Safety and Radiation Protection at Swedish Nuclear Plants in 2003
The safety philosophy upon which the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate’s (SKI) supervisory and regulatory activities are based assumes that multiple physical barriers will exist and that a plant-specific defence-in-depth system will be implemented at each plant. The physical barriers are situated between the radioactive material and the plant personnel and surroundings. In the case of...
Content type: Publications