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• 2004:54 Studies of Corrosion of Cladding Materials in Simulated BWR-environment Using Impedance Measurements

  Stefan Forsberg, Elisabet Ahlberg, Ulf Andersson SKI English...

  Content type: Publications

• 2004:28 Shadow Corrosion Mechanism of Zircaloy

  Mats Ullberg, Gunnar Lysell, Ann-Charlotte Nystrand SKI English...

  Content type: Publications

• 2004:32 A Strain-based Clad Failure Criterion for Reactivity Initiated Accidents in Light Water Reactors

  Lars Olof Jernkvist, Ali R. Massih, Peter Rudling SKI English...

  Content type: Publications

• 2004:52 Phenomenological Studies on Melt-Structure-Water Interactions (MSWI) during Postulated Severe Accidents

  B.R. Sehgal, H.S. Park, A. Giri, A. Karbojian, A. Jasiulevicius, R.C. Hansson, U. Chikkanagoudar, D. Shiferaw, A. Stepanyan SKI English...

  Content type: Publications

• 2004:04 (Volume 1) Dependency Defence and Dependency Analysis Guidance

  Gunnar Johanson, Per Hellström, Tuomas Makamo, Jean-Pierre Bento Michael Knochenhauer, Kurt Pörn SKI English...

  Content type: Publications

• 2004:30 Nonlinear Scattering from Partially Closed Cracks and Imperfect Interfaces

  Claudio Pecorari SKI English...

  Content type: Publications

• 2004:04 (Volume 2) Dependency Defence and Dependency Analysis Guidance

  Gunnar Johanson, Per Hellström, Tuomas Makamo, Jean-Pierre Bento, Michael Knochenhauer, Kurt Pörn SKI English...

  Content type: Publications

• 2004:29 Stress Corrosion Cracking Testing of Non-Sensitised Stainless Steel

  Magnus Hansson, Seiji Yamamoto SKI English...

  Content type: Publications

• 2004:56 Whiskers and Localized Corrosion on Copper in Repository Environment

  Hans-Peter Hermansson, Peter Gillén SKI English...

  Content type: Publications

• 2004:16e Statement of the Situation Concerning Safety and Radiation Protection at Swedish Nuclear Plants in 2003

  The safety philosophy upon which the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate’s (SKI) supervisory and regulatory activities are based assumes that multiple physical barriers will exist and that a plant-specific defence-in-depth system will be implemented at each plant. The physical barriers are situated between the radioactive material and the plant personnel and surroundings. In the case of...

  Content type: Publications