On 22 October 2015, the Government of Sweden commissioned the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) to, in consultation with the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), relevant county administrative boards and the other authorities and stakeholders concerned, perform a review of emergency planning zones and emergency planning distances applying to activities involving ionising radiation.
In this report, SSM presents proposed emergency planning zones and emergency planning distances to surround the nuclear power plants at Forsmark, Oskarshamn and Ringhals, a proposed emergency planning zone around the fuel fabrication plant of Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB in Västerås (hereinafter 'the fuel fabrication plant'), and a proposed emergency planning distance to surround Clab, the central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel, which is located north of Oskarshamn. SSM also accounts for the standpoints serving as the basis of these proposals. These include overall objectives, the activities which in the assessment of SSM are encompassed by the assignment, the types of emergency planning zones and emergency planning distances that should be established, reference levels that should serve as the basis of emergency planning and dose criteria, and intervention levels for different protective actions.
SSM has postulated events for the relevant activities serving as the basis of the proposed emergency planning zones and emergency planning distances. For these events, the Authority has defined representative source terms that describe the releases assumed to follow the respective type of event. Thereafter, SSM has used dispersion and dose calculations to produce a statistical basis for estimating the distances at which it is justified to take different types of protective actions. Based on these distances, the final proposals for emergency planning zones and planning distances to surround the nuclear power plants, the fuel fabrication plant and Clab have been produced by the respective county administrative boards of Uppsala, Kalmar, Halland and Västmanland in collaboration with SSM and MSB.
It is proposed by SSM that the nuclear power plants should be surrounded by a precautionary action zone (PAZ) extending approximately 5 kilometres, and an urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ) extending approximately 25 kilometres. The emergency planning zones are to have planning in place for evacuation, sheltering and iodine thyroid blocking (ITB). Furthermore, information and ITB should be distributed in advance and warnings to the public should be pre-planned. Planning for evacuation of the public is to enable prioritisation of evacuation of the PAZ ahead of evacuation of the UPZ. It is also proposed by SSM to have an extended planning distance (EPD) surrounding the nuclear power plants that extends 100 kilometres. Within the EPD, planning should be in place for relocation based on input from measurements of ground deposition, sheltering, and limited distribution of ITB.
It is proposed by SSM to have the fuel fabrication plant in Västerås surrounded by an UPZ extending approximately 700 metres. Within the UPZ, planning should be in place for sheltering. Outside the site of the fuel fabrication plant, SSM has assessed that no ground deposition can occur in connection with emergencies that justify an EPD.
Moreover, it is proposed by SSM to have Clab surrounded by an EPD extending 2 kilometres. Within the EPD, planning should be in place for relocation based on input from measurements of ground deposition. Outside the site of the Clab facility, it has been assessed by SSM that no radiation doses can occur in connection with emergencies that justify an emergency planning zone. For this reason, the present emergency planning zone should be discontinued.
SSM has, as part of its step-wise licensing review of European Spallation Source ERIC (ESS) in Lund, assessed that emergency planning for the public may be required outside the site of the ESS facility. However, the ESS research facility is not discussed in this report. At the time of carrying out this assignment, there was a lack of sufficient input, thus preventing a final standpoint from being taken relating to emergency planning zones or distances surrounding this facility.
As part of this review of emergency planning zones and emergency planning distances, SSM has looked into the emergency preparedness categories applying to the nuclear facilities at the Studsvik site, and has determined that none of these are to belong to emergency preparedness category II under the Authority's regulations. Therefore, in the assessment of SSM, there is no longer a need for emergency planning zones or emergency planning distances surrounding the nuclear activities taking place at the Studsvik site. Thus, the present emergency planning zone should be discontinued.
In the cases of the nuclear power plants, fuel fabrication plant and Clab, SSM also presents analyses of residual doses, i.e. the possible radiation doses that may occur assuming that the proposed protective actions that should be prepared in the emergency planning zones and emergency planning distances can be implemented in connection with a radiological or nuclear emergency. In addition, SSM presents analyses of needed measures in food production and the possible need for remediation brought about by emergencies at the relevant facilities. The results from these analyses may serve as planning input for regulatory authorities with mandates in the areas of foodstuffs and remediation in connection with releases from nuclear facilities.
SSM proposes, in consultation with MSB, the needed amendments to the Civil Protection Ordinance (2003:789) to enable implementation of the proposed new emergency planning zones and emergency planning distances. Together with MSB and the county administrative boards of Uppsala, Kalmar, Halland and Västmanland, SSM has estimated the economic impacts of these proposals. If the proposals are implemented, they are estimated to lead to increased administrative expenses annually totalling approximately SEK 24 million, in addition to today's appropriation of SEK 48 million. Other costs are incurred when implementing the proposals; these amount to approximately SEK 5.5 million per year over a three-year period. SSM wishes to emphasise the possibility that some of the costs may be lower than estimated, mainly depending on the choice of technical solution for warning the public in the new emergency planning zones. SSM suggests that the higher level of costs for the Swedish state brought about by the proposals should be financed by means of the emergency planning fee stipulated by Ordinance 2008:463 concerning certain fees imposed by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority.
During the efforts to propose new emergency planning zones and emergency planning distances, SSM consulted with MSB and the relevant county administrative boards. Here, three areas were identified as needing further investigation. These areas are the following: systems for warning the public in the proximity of nuclear power plants, mandates for dealing with and recommending intake of ITB, and the emergency classes currently applied by nuclear facilities in Sweden.