The report is a compilation report consisting of three papers.
A safeguards approach for the planned encapsulation facility and the operating final repository is presented in paper 1. Special considerations concerning safeguards for the final disposal process have been discussed and incorporated into the approach.
Paper 2 defines the spent fuel data that must be secured, for safeguards purposes and for national purposes, prior to when the spent fuel assemblies become inaccessible in the final disposal process. A finding according to the paper is that the safeguards approach for the final disposal process should include a gross defect measurement. Furthermore, it is concluded in the paper that the information categories that are sufficient for a national record are available today, but that the information should be completed with the data uncertainties.
In paper 3 a diversion path analysis has been performed for the interim storage and encapsulation facility in the back-end of the Swedish fuel cycle. The diversion path analysis is necessary for defining the safeguards system that can cover all feasible diversion paths.
The objective of this particular diversion path analysis was to form a basis for identifying the safeguards system's need for fuel data.
A conclusion from the diversion path analysis is that it is possible to allow a back-flow of material through the facility without losing the ability to safeguard the nuclear material in the building.